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I. INTRODUCTION
Parental disputes over the custody, visitation, and abuse of children
involve complex jurisdictional issues when the contestants live in different
states.' The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently addressed an interstate
parental dispute in Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole.
2
In Hughs, a mother sought an order for protection on behalf of her
son, and the nonresident defendant father brought a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.3 The father appealed the district court's
dismissal of the motion, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that
the district court had personal jurisdiction over the father by way of Min-
nesota's long-arm statute5 and minimum contacts.6 The father's only
"contact" with the state of Minnesota was his son's recent three month
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 cmt. a (1971). The
complexity is due to the different interests involved and the number of states
which may have a concern. See also Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Per-
sonalJurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 813, 813 (1995) ("The intersection between
family law and jurisdiction is messy."); Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparativist Ru-
minations from the Bayou on Child Custody Jurisdiction: the UCCJA, the PKPA, and the
Hague Convention on Child Abduction, 58 LA. L. REV. 449, 449 (1998) ("Interstate
and international jurisdictional problems are often vexing. They are worse in mat-
ters of child custody.").
2. 572 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). "Hughs" is misspelled in the case
name as it appears in the North Western Reporter, but the mother's name, Bar-
bara Hughes, is spelled correctly in the body of the opinion. This case note there-
fore will refer to the case as "Hughs," but this case note will use the correct spelling
when referring to the mother.
3. See id. at 749-50.
4. See id. at 750.
5. See id. Minnesota's long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction if the defen-
dant commits an act outside of Minnesota causing injury in Minnesota. See MINN.
STAT. § 543.19(1)(d) (1998). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the
legislature designed Minnesota's long-arm statute to extend personal jurisdiction
over non-residents to the limits of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion's Fourteenth Amendment. See Valspar v. Lukken Color Corp., 495 N.W.2d
408, 410 (Minn. 1992) (finding the trial court had personal jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation for purposes of the plaintiff paint manufacturer's declaratory
judgment on a contract between the foreign corporation and the company's
predecessor); Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1978)
(holding that inducing financial transactions within Minnesota subjected the de-
fendant non-resident creditors to personal jurisdiction); Hardrives, Inc. v. City of
LaCrosse, 240 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Minn. 1976) (holding that a foreign corporation
meeting three out of five factors of the test is subject to personal jurisdiction). See
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause).
6. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751-52 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that although the father's only Minnesota contact was with the
son, the minimum contacts requirement was met).
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residency in the state7 and the father's phone calls to his son in Minne-
sota.8
The Hughs decision is important for two reasons. First, the court's
conclusion that the minimum contacts requirement was met is incompati-
ble with precedent;9 the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
father. Second, the court ignored the only valid basis for jurisdiction, the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA").' ° The UCCJA does
7. See id. at 751. The mother and son moved to Minnesota on November 28,
1996, and the petition for child protection was filed on February 18, 1997. See id.
at 749.
8. See id. at 751.
9. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100-01 (1978) (holding that the
court did not have personal jurisdiction over nonresident father who derived no
personal or commercial benefit from his child's presence and who lacked any con-
tact with the state).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 reporter's note, at
81 (1971 & Supp. 1988) ("The black-letter rule and the commentary have been
rewritten in order to reflect that the United States law governing jurisdiction over
custody is now regulated almost entirely by statute."). See id. § 79(b). The control-
ling statute in every state is some form of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act ("UCCJA"). See ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-20 to 30-3-44 (1989); ALASKA STAT. §§
25.30.010 to 25.30.910 (1996 & Supp. 1997); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-401 to
8-424 (1989 & Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-13-201 to 9-13-228 (Michie 1998);
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3400 to 3425 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-13-101
to 14-13-126 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-90 to
46b-114 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1901 to 1925 (1993); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-4501 to 16-4524 (1997 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.1302 to
61.1348 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-9-40 to 19-9-64 (1991 & Supp. 1998);
HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 583-1 to 583-26 (1997); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-1101 to 32-1126
(1983 & Supp. 1998); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2101 to 40/2126 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to 31-1-11.6-24 (West 1979 & Supp.
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1 to 598A.25 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1301 to 38-1326 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.400 to
403.630 (Michie 1984 & Supp. 1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1700 to 13:1724
(West 1983 & Supp. 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 801 to 824 (West 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw §§ 9-201 to 9-224 (1991 & Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209R, §§ 1 to 14 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.651 to
600.673 (West 1981 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01 to 518A.25 (1998);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 to 93-23-47 (1973 & Supp. 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. §§
452.440 to 452.550 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to
40-7-125 (1998); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1201 to 43-1225 (1995 & Supp. 1998);
NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 125A.010 to 125A.250 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A:1
to 458-A:25 (1992 & Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:34-28 to 2A:34-52 (West
1987 & Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10-1 to 40-10-24 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1998); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a to 75-z (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1998); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to 50A-25 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to 14-14-26
(1997); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21 to 3109.37 (Anderson 1994 & Supp.
1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 501 to 527 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 109.700 to 109.930 (1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341 to 5366
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-14-1 to 15-14-26 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782
1999]
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not require personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."
This case note will provide an alternative approach to the court's
.minimum contacts" analysis based on the following theory: an order for
child protection falls under the umbrella of the UCCJA,12 and the court
had a valid jurisdictional basis pursuant to the UCCJA to issue the order
for child protection.
3
II. BACKGROUND
It has been said that the opinions from the United States Supreme
Court on personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts have produced an
unsatisfactory body of law that is extremely difficult for scholars to organ-
ize, synthesize, and comprehend. 4 One way to organize this body of law is
to categorize personal jurisdiction into three bases: service of process on a
defendant while the defendant is physically present in the state, specific
jurisdiction, and general jurisdiction."'
to 20-7-830 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 26-5A-1 to 26-5A-26 (Michie
1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-6-201 to 36-6-225 (1996 & Supp. 1998); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 152.001 to 152.025 (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45c-1 to 78-
45c-26 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1031 to 1051 (1989 & Supp. 1998); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to 20-146 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.27.010 to 26.27.910 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 822.01 to 822.25
(West 1994 & Supp. 1997); W. VA. §§ Code 48-10-1 to 48-10-26 (1996); WYo. STAT.
§§ 20-5-101 to 20-5-125 (1997).
11. See infra Part LV.B and accompanying notes.
12. See MINN. STAT. § 518.A02(b) (1998) ("'Custody determination' means a
court decision court orders, and instructions providing for the custody of a child,
including visitation rights, but does not include a decision relating to child sup-
port or any other monetary obligation of any person."). See also infra Part IV.B and
accompanying notes.
13. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01-518A.25 (1998)(outlining the jurisdictional
requirements to make a child custody determination). See also infra Part IV.D and
accompanying notes. The pertinent federal law, the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act of 1980 ("PKPA"), was also satisfied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994). The
PKPA prohibits a state court from modifying a prior custody determination except
as provided in the Act. See id.
14. See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 508.
15. See generally David D. Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, FED. R.
CIv. P. 4, at 78 (West Supp. 1998) (stating that service of process while the defen-
dant is present in the state is a form of general jurisdiction). This case note con-
siders service of process a separate basis because the test is not the "continuous
and systematic" test of general jurisdiction. See infra Part lI.C and accompanying
notes.
[Vol. 25
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A. Service of Process
In 1877, in Pennoyer v. Neff,16 the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a court to have
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when a judgment im-
poses a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff. 1 Personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant was established by personal service of process.
8
In addition, the Court described two other situations that did not require
personal service: personal status adjudications and in rem proceedings.1 9
When Pennoyer was decided, the defendant's presence in the state was
necessary for personal service of process.2 0 This requirement had its ori-
gin in the common law judicial writ of capias ad respondendum,i
16. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
17. See id. at 733.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 733-34. The Pennoyer Court stated:
Except in cases affecting the personal status of the plaintiff, and cases in
which that mode of service may be considered to have been assented to
in advance, as hereinafter mentioned, the substituted service of process
by publication, allowed by the law of Oregon and by similar laws in other
States, where actions are brought against non-residents, is effectual only
where, in connection with process against the person for commencing
the action, property in the State is brought under the control of the
court, and subjected to its disposition by process adapted to that purpose,
or where the judgment is sought as a means of reaching such property or
affecting some interest therein; in other words, where the action is in the
nature of a proceeding in rem. As stated by Cooley in his Treatise on Con-
stitutional Limitations, 405, for any other purpose than to subject the
property of a non-resident to valid claims against him in the State, "due
process of law would require appearance or personal service before the
defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered."
Id.
20. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), which states in relevant part, "Histori-
cally the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on
their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its rendition of ajudgment per-
sonally binding him.").
21. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 208 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary
provides:
A judicial writ (usually simply termed a "capias," and commonly abbrevi-
ated to ca. resp.) by which actions at law were frequently commenced;
and which commands the sheriff to take the defendant, and him safely
keep, so that he may have his body before the court on a certain day, to
answer the plaintiff in the action. It notifies the defendant to defend suit
and procures his arrest until security for plaintiffs claim is furnished.
1999]
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"whereby a civil action was started through physical seizure of the defen-
dant.""
The Supreme Court, in the 1990 case of Burnham v. Superior Court,
2
3
24addressed the constitutionality of this basis for personal jurisdiction. The
Court held that the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause did not pro-
hibit a California court from exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident fa-
ther based on in-state service of process. 25 The plurality opinion explained
that in order to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process, it has "relied on the principles traditionally
followed by American courts in marking out the territorial limits of each
State's authority." 26 Justice Scalia went on to say that one of the most
firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in the American tra-
dition is the principle that state courts have jurisdiction over nonresidents
27who are physically present in the state. Justice Scalia stressed that this
tradition was not only old, but has been continually practiced by all the
28states. Justice Scalia concluded that "[t] he short of the matter is that ju-
risdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process be-
cause it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define
the due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. -29
Although Burnham was a plurality opinion, personal service of proc-
ess on a defendant present in the state was upheld as one method of es-
tablishing personal jurisdiction."' The Burnham decision is also significant
because it validated the notion that the due process clause could be satis-
fied without relying on a "minimum contacts" analysis."1
Id.
22. Siegel, supra note 15, at 78.
23. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
24. See id. at 607 ("The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment denies California courts jurisdiction over a non-
resident, who was personally served with process while temporarily in that State, in
a suit unrelated to his activities in the State.").
25. See id. at 628.
26. Id. at 609.
27. See id. at 610.
28. See id. at 615.
29. Id. at 619.
30. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 78.
31. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990). The court
noted:
Shafferwas saying, in other words, not that all bases for the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction (including, presumably, in-state service) must be
treated alike and subjected to the "minimum contacts" analysis of Interna-
[Vol. 25
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B. Specific Jurisdiction and Minimum Contacts
In 1945, the "minimum contacts" basis for establishing personal ju-
risdiction was introduced in International Shoe v. Washington.2 The term
"minimum contacts" refers to activities with the state, and the Burnham
Court reviewed the current rule of law:
Our opinion in International Shoe cast those fictions aside and
made explicit the underlying basis of these decisions: Due proc-
ess does not necessarily require the States to adhere to the un-
bending territorial limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer.
The validity of assertion of jurisdiction over a nonconsenting
defendant who is not present in the forum depends upon
whether "the quality and nature of [his] activity" in relation to
the forum renders such jurisdiction consistent with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Subsequent cases
have derived from the International Shoe standard the general
rule that a State may dispense with in-forum personal service on
nonresident defendants in suits arising out of their activities in
the State.
33
This "minimum contacts" rule-that a state has personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants in suits arising out of the defendant's activi-
ties in the state-is termed "specific jurisdiction.
34
Specific jurisdiction requires two elements: the defendant must pur-
posefully direct his activities at the forum state, and the litigation must re-
tional Shoe, but rather that quasi in rem jurisdiction, that fictional "ancient
form," and in personamjurisdiction, are really one and the same and must
be treated alike-leading to the conclusion that quasi in remjurisdiction,
i.e., that form of in personamjurisdiction based upon a "property owner-
ship" contact and by definition unaccompanied by personal, in-state serv-
ice, must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of International
Shoe.
Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor disagreed and said that
the minimum contacts analysis was more sensible. See id. at 630.
32. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stat-
ing that the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state
"such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice"').
33. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 618 (citations omitted). The Court is referring to
the fictions of "consent" and "presence." See id. at 617-18.
34. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8
(1984).
1999l
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suit from those activities.3- A nonresident defendant "purposefully di-
rects" his activities at state residents when the "purposeful availment" re-
quirement is met.3 The "purposeful availment" test was described in Han-
son v. Denckla:
3 7
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will
vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but
it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.8
"This 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortui-
tous,' or 'attenuated' contacts.., or of the 'unilateral activity of another
party or a third person.'"9
Thus, a state's personal jurisdiction over a defendant is not estab-
lished every time a plaintiff moves to another state; a nonresident defen-
dant's amenability to suit in a forum state does not travel with a chattel or
• 40
relation.4 This rule was applied in Kulko v. Calfornia Superior Court.4'
There, the Supreme Court held that it was arbitrary to subject the non-
resident father to suit in any State in which the mother chose to live with
their child.4
The second requirement of specific jurisdiction, that the litigation
must arise out of or relate to the act, has not been addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.43 Case law in Minnesota requires that there be some
35. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citing Kee-
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales, 466
U.S. at 414).
36. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). It
is possible that purposeful direction is synonymous with "purposeful availment".
Both the majority and the concurring opinion use the phrase "purposeful avail-
ment." See id. at 112-22.
37. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
38. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
39. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980); Helicopteros Naciona-
les, 466 U.S. at 417).
40. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296-97.
41. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
42. See id. at 93.
43. See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 416 n.10. The Court explained:
[Vol. 25
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connection between the cause of action and the contacts."
In summary, specific jurisdiction requires an act of "purposeful
availment" within the state and for the litigation to arise out of or be re-
lated to that act. Specific jurisdiction is limited to particular claims; how-
ever, general jurisdiction allows any claim to be brought.
C. GeneralJurisdiction
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the
defendant's activities in the forum state, due process is not offended by a
state subjecting the defendant to personal jurisdiction when there are suf-
ficient contacts between the state and the defendant. 45 This exercise of
personal jurisdiction is called "general jurisdiction."" Contacts with a fo-
rum state will be sufficient for general jurisdiction when they are continu-
ous and systematic.
With an understanding of the three bases for personal jurisdiction,
the issue in Hughs, whether the requirements of specific jurisdiction-
("minimum contacts") were met, can be addressed.
We do not address the validity or consequences of such a distinction be-
cause the issue has not been presented in this case. Respondents have
made no argument that their cause of action either arose out of or is re-
lated to Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas. Absent any briefing on
the issue, we decline to reach the questions (1) whether the terms "aris-
ing out of" and "related to" describe different connections between a
cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a forum, and (2) what
sort of tie between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a fo-
rum is necessary to a determination that either connection exists. Nor
do we reach the question whether, if the two types of relationship differ,
a forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction in a situation where the cause
of action "relates to," but does not "arise out of," the defendant's contacts
with the forum should be analyzed as an assertion of specific jurisdiction.
Id.
44. See Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 240 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Minn. 1976)
("In short, it cannot be said that the cause of action is completely unrelated to the
contacts."). In dictum, the Minnesota Supreme Court also said that the plaintiffs'
cause of action arose, in part, out of the defendants' contacts with the state. See id.
As an example, the court cited the defendants' inspections in Minnesota as con-
tacts, and the court cited those same inspections as an element of the plaintiffs'
breach of contract claim. See id.
45. See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414.
46. See id. at 415 n.9.
47. See id. at 415-16.
1999]
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III. THE HUGHS DECISION
A. The Facts
Gerald Cole and Barb Hughes lived together in New Jersey when
Hughes gave birth to a son. 4" The couple separated; the Superior Court of
New Jersey declared Cole the legal father of the boy and granted Cole visi-
tation rights for three months each summer.49 Subsequently, Hughes and
the child moved to Ohio, and Cole moved to Pennsylvania.0 From 1989
to 1996, the child visited Cole in Pennsylvania each summer."
Hughes and the child moved to Minnesota on November 28, 1996,
and Hughes filed a petition for an order for protection on behalf of the
child on February 18, 1997.52 Hughes testified that Cole abused the child
during the summer visitations on several occasions.53 The trial court de-
nied Cole's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 54 The trial
court stated that the child's presence in Minnesota provided the basis for
jurisdiction.' 5
B. The Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
holding that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Cole. 56 The
court applied a minimum contacts analysis to reach this decision,57 which
emphasized a five factor test5 8 found in Minnesota common law prece-
48. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
49. See id. at 748.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 748-49.
52. See id. at 749.
53. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997). Cole allegedly slapped the boy in the face and the back of the head,
punched the boy's leg, arm, and back, elbowed the boy, and forced the boy's head
into a bed. See id. Cole's mother-in-law allegedly backhanded the boy, causing the
boy's nose to bleed. See id.
54. See id. at 749.
55. See id. The trial court ultimately determined that domestic abuse did oc-
cur and issued a protective order for one year. See id.
56. See id. at 752. The appellate court also held that the record contained suf-
ficient evidence to support the claim of abuse. See id.
57. See id. at 750-51.
58. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Minn. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985). The "minimum contacts" test used in Minnesota
looks at: 1) the quantity of contacts with the forum state; 2) the nature and quality
of contacts; 3) the source and connection of the cause of action with these con-
tacts; 4) the interest of the state providing a forum; and 5) the convenience of the
[Vol. 25
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In addressing the first factor, the quantity of contacts, the court
found that Cole's only contact in Minnesota was his son. 6° In analyzing
the second factor, the nature and quality of contacts, the court said that it
"must determine whether the nonresident purposely availed himself of
the benefits and protections of Minnesota law." 61 When the court made
this determination, it said that Cole could have anticipated custody or visi-
tation matters being dealt with in Minnesota because the boy was living in
Minnesota. 6' The court also pointed out that Cole had a continuing rela-
tionship with his son.63
In applying the third factor, the court observed that there was a di-
rect relationship between an order for protection and Cole's contact, his
son, in Minnesota. The court also determined that Cole could foresee
possible consequences from the abuse arising in Minnesota.5
The court reached the fourth factor and asserted that Minnesota has
a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children.6 Finally, the
court decided the fifth factor by concluding that the inconvenience for
Cole was minimal because the "issues involve the same facts, witnesses,
and documents."
67
parties. See id. The first three factors are primary, the last two receive secondary
consideration. See id. at 720. The fourth factor, Minnesota's interest in providing
a forum for its residents, is not itself a "contact" and cannot establish personal ju-
risdiction. See Sherburne County Soc. Servs. ex rel. Pouliot v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d
866, 868 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc.,
332 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Minn. 1983)). The fifth factor is irrelevant unless the de-
fendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state. See Sherburne County, 426
N.W.2d at 868 (quoting West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 680
(Minn. 1983)).
59. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 750-51 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997). The court mentions International Shoe but does not apply any U.S. Supreme
Court case law. See id.
60. See id. at 751. It should be noted, however, that the court also examined
the plurality of contacts and mentioned numerous phone calls. See id.
61. Id. The court does not mention purposeful availment again. See id.
62. See id. at 751.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE HUGHS DECISION
The Hughs case presented a dilemma for the court. On the one
hand, the court had an interest in providing a forum to adjudicate the al-
legation of abuse and protect the child. However, in accomplishing that
goal, the court was required to balance the due process interests of the fa-
ther.
This analysis will show that the court's solution to this dilemma, a
"minimum contacts" analysis, was both illogical and inconsistent with
precedent. The court should have relied on the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") exception to personal jurisdiction. An inter-
state protective order, like the one issued by the Hughs court, falls under
the umbrella of the UCCJA. 6n Had the court applied the UCCJA to the
facts of this case, it would have had a solid and legitimate basis for issuing
the protective order.
A. The Defendant Father Had No "Minimum Contacts" with Minnesota
Faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
court applied the "minimum contacts" analysis discussed above. 69 The fa-
ther did not have "minimum contacts" with Minnesota because the re-
quirements of specific jurisdiction were not met. One's child is not a
"contact"; the father's telephone calls were not acts of purposeful avail-
ment, and the father's telephone calls were not related to the abuse. Be-
fore applying the specific jurisdiction requirements to the Hughs facts, the
correlation between specific jurisdiction and Minnesota's five factor test
must be established. 70
68. See infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.
69. See Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 750-51. See also supra Part III.B and accompany-
ing notes.
70. As explained in Part II, there are three bases for personal jurisdiction:
personal service of process when the defendant is present in the state; general ju-
risdiction, and specific jurisdiction. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
Since the first two bases were inapplicable, the court felt compelled to use a mini-
mum contacts analysis. See Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 750-51.
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1. Minnesota's Five Factor Test and Specific Jurisdiction
The first three Minnesota "factors" are really the elements of specific
jurisdiction and are required for there to be "minimum contacts."7 ' This
is evident when one compares the "specific jurisdiction" test with those
three factors.
Specific jurisdiction requires there to be an act of purposeful avail-
ment that is related to the cause of action.n This statement can be broken
down into three elements: 1) an act or acts by the defendant; 2) the act or
acts must be one of purposeful availment; and 3) the act or acts must be
related to the plaintiffs cause of action. It is important to remember
that the term "act" is synonymous with "contact" in a personal jurisdiction
analysis; perhaps the Supreme Court in International Shoe should have said
"minimum acts."74
In comparison, the first three factors in the Minnesota five part test
are the quantity of contacts, the quality and nature of the contacts, and
the connection between the contacts and the cause of action.75 The first
Minnesota factor, quantity of contacts, is solely a question of whether the
defendant committed some act with the forum state; this is essentially a
predicate for specific jurisdiction. In analyzing the second Minnesota
factor, nature and quality of contacts, the court in Hughs said "it must de-
termine whether the nonresident purposely availed himself of the benefits
and protections of Minnesota law."77; this is the same as element one of
specific jurisdiction. 78 The third factor of Minnesota's five factor test is
identical to the second element of specific jurisdiction: there must be a
71. See generally Defoe v. Lawson, 389 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that the minimum contacts or "fair warning" requirement is satisfied if the
out-of-state defendant has "purposefully directed" his activities at forum residents,
and the alleged injuries "arise out of or relate to" those activities).
72. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
73. The same specific jurisdiction test can be compressed into two elements.
See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
74. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(requiring certain minimum acts so that jurisdiction may comport with fairness);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (identifying activities as
elements of specific jurisdiction); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (discussing the act of purposeful availment).
75. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Minn. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985)
76. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
77. Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
78. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
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connection between the contacts and the cause of action. 79 Finally, the
fourth and fifth Minnesota factors do not establish personal jurisdiction
and are irrelevant unless the first three elements are met.8°
Thus, the first three factors in Minnesota's five part test are the same
as the elements of specific jurisdiction. In order for there to be "mini-
mum contacts," all of the elements of specific jurisdiction must be met.
This test was not met in the Hughs case. This Note will analyze each possi-
ble "contact" of the father and show that the requirements of specific ju-
risdiction (the first three Minnesota factors) were not met.
2. One's Child is Not a "Contact"
The first requirement of specific jurisdiction is that the defendant
have "contacts" or activities with the forum state."' The court in Hughs says
that the defendant's son is his contact with Minnesota.82 This conclusion
is in conflict with Kulko v. Superior Court,83 a U. S. Supreme Court case, and
Sherburne County Social Services ex rel. Pouliot v. Kennedy,84 decided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
In Kulko, the Supreme Court applied the minimum contacts test to a
dispute about child support."" First, the Court rejected personal jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the father's agreement at the time of separation to al-
low his children to live with their mother in California. 86 To find jurisdic-
tion in a state merely because the mother was living there, according to
the Court, would discourage parents from entering into visitation agree-
ments.87 Additionally, the Court noted that finding jurisdiction on this ba-
sis would arbitrarily subject the nonresident parent to suit in any state
where the custodial parent chose to live.m
Finally, the Court said that, although California had a substantial in-
terest in protecting resident children, the child's presence in the state by
itself was not enough to make California a fair forum. 9
79. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
80. See Sherburne County Soc. Servs. ex rel. Pouliot v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d
866, 868 (Minn. 1985).
81. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Minn. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1006 (1985).
82. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
83. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
84. 426 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 1988).
85. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97 (applying the minimum contacts test).
86. See id. at 93.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 100-01.
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In Sherburne, the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that "[t]he
critical focus in any jurisdictional analysis is 'the relationship among the
defendant, the forum and the litigation.' Importantly, this relationship is
defined by the defendant's contacts with the forum state, not with its resi-
dents."90 Thus, in Hughs, the Minnesota Court of Appeals erred in con-
cluding that Cole's son was his Minnesota "contact." It is difficult to un-
derstand how the court transformed a relative into an activity fulfilling
minimum contacts. A Minnesota resident cannot simply "be" the needed
contact or activity; personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is clear that the
terminology of a "contact" is meant to refer to "activities," not a relative."'
Consequently, Cole's son was not a contact, and the first Minnesota
factor was not met. This would normally defeat an assertion of personal
jurisdiction, but the Hughs court also recognized an activity that could be
construed as a contact-the father's telephone calls to his son in Minne-
sota. Conceding that the father's telephone calls could be the necessary
activity with Minnesota, the second and third elements of specific jurisdic-
tion needed to be met.
3. The Father's Telephone Calls Were Not Acts of Purposeful
Availment
The second Minnesota factor, the nature and quality of the contact,
is dispositive. 2 In Kulko, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the fa-
ther's acquiescence in his child's desire to live in California did not mean
that he purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of
California's laws.93 Police and fire protection, hospital services, and rec-
reational facilities were benefits to the child, not the father.94 Minnesota
courts, too, have applied the "purposeful availment" test in family disputes
a number of times.95
90. Sherburne, 426 N.W.2d at 868 (Minn. 1988) (citing West Am. Ins. Co. v.
Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Minn. 1983) and Stangel v. Rucker, 398
N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
91. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
92. Sherburne, 426 N.W.2d at 868 (citing Marquette Nat'l v. Norris, 270
N.W.2d 290, 295 (Minn. 1978)).
93. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978).
94. See id. at 94 n.7.
95. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the nonresident father "pur-
posefully availed" himself of the benefits of Minnesota law by marrying within the
state and by claiming his child as a state tax deduction. See In re Impola, 464
N.W.2d 296, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). In another case, a husband's summer va-
cations, periodic stays, and phone calls did not rise to the level of purposefully
availing himself of the benefits and protections of Minnesota law. See Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis supplied). Simi-
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In Hughs, the court correctly states the rule that Cole must purpose-
fully avail himself of the benefits and protections of Minnesota law, but
the court never discusses this crucial determination. Instead, the court
simply concludes that Cole could have anticipated Minnesota litigation.9
Under Burger King and Sherburne, however, a court must find purposeful
availment before specific jurisdiction attaches.7
The Hughs court, rather than squarely addressing purposeful avail-
ment, instead stressed Cole's continuing relationship with his son.98 But
the court's reasoning, in effect, punishes Cole for talking to his son on the
telephone. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Kulko, did not con-
sider a father's good faith contacts with his child to be acts of purposeful
availment.9
Thus, the Hughs court had no good reason to ignore the purposeful
availment requirement of specific jurisdiction. It is difficult to imagine
how a father's good faith telephone calls to his son could be considered
purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of Minnesota's
laws.1°°
The court does, however, attempt to apply the reasonably foreseeable
larly, paying legal fees to a Minnesota firm in connection with the dissolution pro-
ceeding, providing care for a minor child after the child had been abducted, and
lying about the child's whereabouts in a phone conversation were insufficient con-
tacts. See Stangel v. Rucker, 398 N.W.2d 602, 605-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Fi-
nally, a nonresident defendant was not purposefully availing himself of the finan-
cial benefits of the state's welfare laws by having sexual intercourse with a
Minnesota resident on the eve of his departure from Minnesota. See Sherburne
County Soc. Servs. ex rel. Pouliot v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d, 866, 869 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997).
96. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
("[A]ppellant may have reasonably assumed that because the boy was living in
Minnesota, it might result in custody or visitation matters being dealt with by the
Minnesota courts.").
97. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (holding
that a forum can assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has
not consented to suit there if the "defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activi-
ties at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged injuries that
'arise out of or relate to' those activities"); Sherburne County Soc. Servs. v. Ken-
nedy, 426 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Minn. 1988) (holding that a nonresident defendant
was not purposefully availing himself of the state's laws by having sexual inter-
course with a Minnesota resident.).
98. See Hughs ex re. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997). S
99. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (stating that a father
who agrees, in the interest of family harmony, to allow his child to spend more
time in California than required under law can hardly be said to have purposefully
availed himself)
100. There is nothing in the record of the Hughs case indicating the telephone
calls were abusive or damaging.
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test of Howells v. McKibben.'0 ' This attempt fails because Cole's son was not
living in Minnesota at the time of the abuse.
0 2
In Howells, the court said it was "reasonably foreseeable by defendant
that a continued sexual relationship with plaintiff, a Minnesota resident,
might result in the injuries suffered by plaintiff and that those injuries
would be sustained in this state."' 3
Recently, a federal court explained why injury by itself in the forum
state is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction:
Instead of grounding jurisdiction on a defendant's decision to
"purposely avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state," or on a defendant's activities "expressly
aimed" at the forum state,jurisdiction would depend on a plain-
tiff's decision about where to establish residence. Such a theory
would always make jurisdiction appropriate in a plaintiffs home
state, for the plaintiff always feels the impact of the harm
there.'04
In the Hughs case, at the time of the abuse, Cole could not have pos-
sibly foreseen that Hughes and her son would move to Minnesota.'00 Us-
ing the language from Howells, and, assuming that abuse occurred, it was
impossible for Cole to foresee that abusing his son, an Ohio resident,
might result in injuries occurring in Minnesota. Using the court's logic, a
parent could move to any state and a defendant's prior conduct would fol-
low the parent.
Although the son felt the impact of the abuse in Minnesota in the
Hughs case, the son was an Ohio resident at the time of the abuse and it is
plainly impossible that the father could have foreseen injury occurring in
Minnesota.
101. 281 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. 1979).
102. See Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 748-49. The abuse occurred in the summer of
1995 and 1996. See id. Hughes and her son moved to Minnesota in November,
1996. See id.
103. Howells, 281 N.W.2d at 157.
104. Esab Group, Inc. v. Gentricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 1997) (ci-
tations omitted).
105. If Hughes had relatives in Minnesota or discussed about moving to Min-
nesota during the summers of 1995 or 1996, the court's reasoning might be appli-
cable, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that Hughes had any prior
connection to Minnesota.
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4. The Father's Telephone Calls Were Not Related to the Alleged
Abuse
The third element of specific jurisdiction requires a connection be-
tween a defendant's activities and the cause of action. The litigation
must arise out of or relate to the act.1
7
In Hughs, the litigation originated as a petition for an order for child
protection because of the father's alleged abuse of his son in Pennsylvania
during the summer of 1996. The father's only arguable contact with Min-
nesota was his telephone calls to his son in Minnesota in 1997.108 There is
no indication from the court's opinion that the father's telephone calls
were abusive, threatening or even remotely related to the abuse that oc-
curred the previous summer.1°9 The father's telephone calls to his son
were not related to the cause of action.
In sum, the father did not have "minimum contacts" with Minnesota
because the requirements of specific jurisdiction were not met: one's child
is not a "contact," the father's telephone calls were not acts of purposeful
availment, and the telephone calls were not related to the abuse. Instead
of a making a futile minimum contacts analysis, the court should have
looked to the UCCJA exception to personal jurisdiction.
B. Interstate Child Protective Orders Fall Under the Umbrella of the
UCCJA
The UCCJA governs interstate child custody determinations in virtu-
ally any form." ° Determinations under Minnesota's Domestic Abuse Act,'
106. See supra Part IV.A.1 for a description of the relationship between Minne-
sota's five factor test and specific jurisdiction.
107. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
108. See supra Part IV.A.3 and accompanying notes.
109. See Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 747.
110. See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 497. See, e.g., A.E.H.v.C.C., 468 N.W.2d
190, 200 (Wis. 1991) (holding that a termination of parental rights is governed by
the UCCJA). But see, State ex reL R.N.J. v. M.M.J., 908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (holding that the termination of parental rights is not a custody proceeding
under the UCCJA). A number of states have concluded that a guardianship pro-
ceeding, with respect to a minor, is covered under the term "custody proceeding"
and must comply with the UCCJA. See, e.g., A.E.H. v. C.C., 468 N.W.2d 190, 199
(Wis. 1991); Walling v. Walling, 727 P.2d 586, 690 (Okla. 1986); Rayv. Ray, 494 So.
2d 634, 637 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986); Gribkoff v. Bedford, 711 P.2d 176, 178 (Or.
App. 1985); In reWonderly, 423 N.E.2d 420, 423-24 (Ohio 1981). The majority of
the courts which have addressed the issue have held that the UCCJA is applicable
to abuse and neglect proceedings. See, e.g., In re Pima CountyJuvenile Action, 712
P.2d 431, 432 (Ariz. 1986); L.G. v. People ex rel. K.G., 890 P.2d 647, 648 (Colo.
1995); In re E.H., 612 N.E.2d 174, 182 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); State ex rel. Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Avinger, 720 P.2d 290, 292 (N.M. 1986) (applying New Mexico's
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which authorizes temporary restraining orders, are custody determina-
tions when one parent is excluded from the home and children are in-
volved. 12 The UCCJA should have been applied to the Hughs order for
child protection. This conclusion is based on the statutory language of
the UCCJA, Minnesota's Domestic Abuse Act, together with the admission
of the Hughs court and the guidance of South Dakota's Supreme Court in
Zappitello v. Moses."'
The UCCJA limits the situations in which a state court has jurisdic-
tion to make a child custody determination in a custody proceeding."' A
"custody determination" is defined as a "court decision and court orders
and instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation
rights, but does not include a decision relating to child support or any
other monetary obligation of any person.""5
Furthermore, "custody proceedings" are defined as "proceedings in
which a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an action
for dissolution, divorce or separation, and includes child neglect and de-
pendency proceedings."" 6 Minnesota's Domestic Abuse Act outlines the
available relief for plaintiffs and specifically mentions custody and visita-
tion." '7 Subdivision six provides:
(a) Upon notice and hearing, the court may provide relief as
follows:...
(4) award temporary custody or establish temporary visita-
tion with regard to minor children of the parties on a basis
which gives primary consideration to the safety of the vic-
tim and the children...."'
Child CustodyJurisdiction Act, which is modeled after the UCCJA, to child neglect
and dependency hearings).
111. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (1998).
112. See Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 1992) ("There is an obvi-
ous practical need to deal with custody issues when one parent is excluded from
the home." ). See also Matter of Marriage of Rowland, 884 P.2d 561, 564-65 (Or.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a mother's motion for a temporary protective order
of restraint was effectively a request to modify a custody determination of another
state court and she was required to comply with the UCCJA).
113. 458 N.W.2d 784, 785 (S.D. 1990) (holding that the UCCJA must be satis-
fied when a domestic abuse act is implicated).
114. MINN. STAT. § 518A.03, subd. 1 (1998).
115. Id. § 518A.02(b).
116. Id. § 518A.02(c).
117. See id. § 518B.01, subd. 6.
118. Id. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a) (4).
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In the Hughs case, the court modified the New Jersey custody deter-
mination that granted the father visitation rights during the months of
June,July, and August. 9 The court, in effect, gave the mother custody for
those three months so that she did not have to send her son to the fa-
ther.20 In granting this relief the court gave primary consideration to the
safety of the son; their actions are in accordance with the Domestic Abuse
Act.2 1 When the Hughs court awarded temporary custody to the mother,
their decision was a custody determination as defined by the UCCJA1n be-.., 123
cause it granted the mother custody rights.
The Hughs court essentially acknowledged that it was dealing with a
custody or visitation matter when the it said, "Furthermore, appellant may
have reasonably assumed that, because the boy was living in Minnesota, it
might result in custody and visitation matters being dealt with by the Min-
nesota courts.
" 12 4
South Dakota resolved a similar jurisdictional dilemma by employing
the UCCJA. The South Dakota Supreme Court, in Zappitello v. Moses, held:
The sole issue for consideration is whether civil matters arising
out of the South Dakota Domestic Abuse Act, SDCL 25-10 (Do-
mestic Abuse Act), are subject to the jurisdictional requirements
set forth in the South Dakota Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act, SDCL 26-5A (UCCJA). We hold that in cases involving
allegations of domestic abuse which involve interstate custody
disputes the UCCJA's jurisdictional requirements must be satis-
fied before South Dakota courts may exercise jurisdiction.
20
The Zappitello court explained that the case involved the precise diffi-
culties arising out of child custody disputes which the UCCJA was in-
tended to prevent.2 6 The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
when the facts of a Domestic Abuse Act case contain issues of divergent
119. Hughs ex reL Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
120. See id. at 749.
121. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(4).
122. The UCCJA applies to temporary custody orders. See In re Marriage of
Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d 99, 107 (Minn. 1989) (concluding that the legislature in-
tended temporary orders to be included in the scope of the UCCJA).
123. See MINN. STAT. § 518A.02(b).
124. Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 751.
125. Zappitello v. Moses, 458 N.W.2d 784, 785 (S.D. 1990). The salient differ-
ence between the Hughs case and Zappitello is that in Zappitello the father made the
allegations of abuse on the last day of his summer visitation rights. See id.
126. See id. at 786.
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citizenship, the UCCJA applies. 12
The UCCJA should have been applied to the Hughs order for child
protection; the statutory language of the UCCJA and Domestic Abuse Act,
the admission of the Hughs court, and the persuasive authority of Zappi-
telloa 2 8 support this conclusion. The applicability of the UCCJA in the
Hughs case was necessary because the court did not have personal jurisdic-
tion over the father, and the UCCJA does not require personal jurisdic-
tion.
C. The UCCJA Exception to PersonalJurisdiction
Simply stated, the UCCJA does not require personal jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident defendant.12 First, this section will outline
the impetus for the UCCJA. Next, the rationale for the UCCJA ex-
ception to personal jurisdiction will be explained. Finally, the con-
stitutionality of this exception is addressed.
1. Impetus for the UCCJA
The UCCJA was enacted by all fifty states to combat the problems as-
sociated with the multiple jurisdictional bases for child custody determina-
tions.12° The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states that there were
three jurisdictional bases for child custody determinations: the presence
of the child; the domicile of the child; or personal jurisdiction over both
parents.13
127. See id. at 787.
128. See id. at 785.
129. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODYJURISDICrION AcT § 12, 9 U.L.A. 274 (1988)
(stating that there is no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction since cus-
tody determinations are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status). See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Torres v. Torres, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 352 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983); In reJackson, 562 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (Miss. 1990);
Pratt v. Pratt, 431 A.2d 405, 409 (R.I. 1981); Hudson v. Hudson, 670 P.2d 287, 293
(Wash. Ct. App. 1983); McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611, 612 (W. Va. 1984); Da-
vidson v. Davidson, 485 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
130. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 cmt. b (1971 & Supp.
1988). This provision provides:
These different bases of jurisdiction owed their existence to the conflict-
ing interests involved. The domicile of a child was deemed an adequate
basis on the ground that custody is a question of status and hence is sub-
ject to the control of the State where the child is domiciled.... The
State where a child is physically present could be said to have the most
immediate concern with his welfare. Its courts would also have direct ac-
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has used multiple jurisdictional bases
for child custody cases. Specifically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
held that a child custody determination is a status determination that can
be made by the state in which the child is domiciled. 32 The court, how-
ever, also said that infants and other persons lacking the physical and
mental capacity to protect themselves have been accorded special protec-
tion by the state, regardless of the child's domicile, based on the state as
parens patriae 3 3 In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the
state that can best serve the interests of the child should have jurisdic-
tion, 134 and that parental interests must give way to the welfare of the
child. 
135
The multiple jurisdictional bases for child custody cases gave rise to
cess to the child and might be most qualified to decide what would be in
the child's best interest. The third jurisdictional basis, personal jurisdic-
tion over the persons who were competing for the child's custody (nor-
mally, the parents), placed emphasis upon the interests of the competing
parties.
Id.
132. See State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 491, 252 N.W. 329, 330
(1934). The Larson court observed:
The question of jurisdiction as here presented is a new one in this state.
An examination of certain fundamental principles of conflict of laws is
therefore necessary, bearing in mind always that here we are not dealing
with substantive property rights but with the question of the domicile of a
child and the jurisdiction of courts to deal with matters of custody, which
jurisdiction depends upon a determination of the question of domicile.
A proceeding to determine custody of a minor child partakes of the na-
ture of an action in rem, the res being the child's status or his legal rela-
tionship to another. Except where necessary as a police measure, it
would seem that the only court which has power to fix, to change, or to
alter this status is the court of the state in which the minor child is domi-
ciled.
Id. (citations omitted).
133. See Glasier v. Glasier, 137 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. 1965). Parens patriae
literally means "parent of the country" and refers to the role of a state as sovereign
and guardian of persons under legal disability; parens patriae also refers to the
state's role in child custody determinations when acting to protect the child's in-
terest. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
134. See Longseth v. Columbia County, 162 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Minn. 1968)
("Probably the better rule is that it does not involve constitutional issues at all, but
is simply a matter of comity and that the courts of the state which has the greatest
interest in the child ought to be permitted to determine its custody.").
135. See Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. 1992) ("While both par-
ents have strong interests in the custody and enjoyment of their child, a parent's
love and affection must yield to considerations of the child's welfare.").
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conflicting adjudications of custody among different states.'36 A parent
against whom a custody decree had been rendered in one state could re-
move the child to another state and seek a new custody decree. 137 In an
atmosphere of virtually no jurisdictional limitations, courts were actively
asserting initial and modified child custody decrees. 138 It is estimated that
there were 25,000 to 100,000 incidents of child abductions per year.""'
The UCCJA was the legislative response to this problem and restricts the
circumstances in which a court is competent to grant an interstate custody
decree. 14°
The Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Giblin endorsed the UCCJA
and urged the legislature to enact it.'4' Minnesota's version of the UCCJA
became effective in 1977.14' The court in Hughs ought to have used the
UCCJA exception to personal jurisdiction instead of making a specious
"minimum contacts" analysis.
2. Rationale for the UCCJA Exception to Personal Jurisdiction
The usual rationale for the UCCJA exception to personal jurisdiction
is expressed in Hudson v. Hudson:
143
We find a petitioner need not demonstrate minimum contacts
under International Shoe between the absent parent and the fo-
rum in custody proceedings under the UCCJL. Rather, custody
is in effect an adjudication of a child's status, which falls under
the status exception of Shaffer v. Heitner. A court may therefore
adjudicate custody under the UCCJL without acquiring per-
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 79 cmt. a (1971 &
Supp. 1988).
137. See id.
138. See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 449.
139. See id. at 464.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 79 cmt. b (1971 &
Supp. 1988); Blakesley, supra note 1, at 450.
141. See In re Giblin, 232 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Minn. 1975). The Giblin court
stated:
We regard the Uniform Child CustodyJurisdiction Act as an authoritative
statement of the rules currently to be preferred in dealing with the prob-
lems encountered in the instant case. Several states have adopted in
whole or in part this uniform act, and we commend it to the legislature
for adoption with such modification as its policy decisions may dictate.
Id.
142. SeeMINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01-.25 (1998).
143. 670 P.2d 287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
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sonal jurisdiction over an absent party given reasonable at-
tempts to furnish notice of the proceedings.'"
Pennoyer recognized a status exception to personal jurisdiction.'4 5 Al-
though the Court in Shaffer negated the "in rem" exception to personal
jurisdiction,'" the court referred to cases involving the personal status of
the plaintiff as necessary litigation 147 that did not violate the standard of
fairness.'"8
The Supreme Court has held that personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident spouse is not necessary to dissolve a marriage because it is a status
determination. 49 Traditionally, child custody determinations have also
been exempt from the personal jurisdiction requirement.'" The original
144. Id. at 293 (citation omitted). The UCCJL is Washington's version of the
UCCJA.
145. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877). The Court stated:
To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is
proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by any thing we have
said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status
of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding
within the State, though made without service of process or personal no-
tice to the non-resident. The jurisdiction which every State possesses to
determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves
authority to prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting
them may be commenced and carried on within its territory.
Id.
146. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
147. See id. at 201. The Shaffer Court noted:
Pennoyer itself recognized that its rigid categories, even as blurred by the
kind of action typified by Harris, could not accommodate some necessary
litigation. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Field's opinion carefully noted that
cases involving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as divorce actions,
could be adjudicated in the plaintiffs home State even though the de-
fendant could not be served within that State.
Id.
148. See id. at 209 n.30 ("We do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other
than those discussed in text, such as the particularized rules governing adjudica-
tions of status, are inconsistent with the standard of fairness.").
149. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942).
150. See generally In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 543 P.2d 454, 459 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1975) ("When the issue is primarily between the state in its parens patriae ca-
pacity and an absent non-consenting spouse, the state is justified in providing for
effective termination proceedings, even in the absence of in personam jurisdiction
over a non-consenting parent."); Wenz v. Schwartze, 598 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Mont.
1979) ("In light of the weight of authority, we must agree that personal jurisdic-
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drafters of the UCCJA stated that custody determinations were status ex-
ceptions and exempt from the personal jurisdiction requirement. 51
Instead of requiring a defendant to have "minimum contacts" with
the forum state, the UCCJA requires a state to have "maximum contacts"
with the child.15 As a result of this different standard, when the parties in
a child support and child custody case reside in different states,"' a court
may be able to grant custody, but not child support.5
In sum, when a state court makes a child custody determination pur-
suant to the UCCJA, personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
tion over a parent is not necessary to the termination of his parental rights to a
minor child, so long as the parent has actual notice of the termination proceed-
ings .... "); In re S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992) (permitting adjudication of
parental rights without a showing of personal jurisdiction); A.E.H. v. C.C., 468
N.W.2d 190, 199 (Wis. 1991) (holding that appropriate jurisdictional analysis was
to focus on child's contacts with the state); MonicaJ. Allen, Child-State Jurisdiction:
A Due Process Invitation To Reconsider Some Basic Family Law Assumptions, 26 FAM. L.Q.
293, 306 (1992) ("Because jurisdiction over child custody determinations derives
from the child's contacts with the state, a parent's contacts with the state are ir-
relevant."); Blakesley, supra note 1, at 462. But see In re Doe, 926 P.2d 1290, 1299
(Haw. 1996) (holding that personal jurisdiction must exist to adjudicate a party's
parental rights).
151. See Brigitte Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child
Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 229, 246 (1979).
152. See Roderick v. Roderick, 776 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)
("The UCCJA's jurisdictional standards are markedly different from those nor-
mally applicable to civil cases. Rather than using the traditional minimum con-
tacts analysis, [the UCCJA sections] direct the courts to make jurisdictional deci-
sions on the basis of which state has the maximum contacts with the child and its
family."); Plas v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. Rptr. 490, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that the UCCJA requires the child to have minimum contacts with the
forum state); A.E.H. v. C.C., 468 N.W.2d 190, 198 (Wis. 1991) (concluding that
jurisdiction under the UCCJA necessitates that the child has maximum contacts
with the state).
153. This situation occurs frequently. See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 449 ("The
volatility of child custody disputes and the tendency of parents to move to differ-
ent and separate jurisdictions traditionally caused and continues to cause difficult
problems for children, parents, and the legal system."). See also Allen, supra note
150, at 294 ("The personal jurisdiction requirement poses a virtually insurmount-
able procedural barrier to establishment of child support obligations by obligee
parents who no longer live in the marital state.").
154. See In reAbu-Dalbouh, 547 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (hold-
ing that because child custody and child support determinations operate under
different standards for jurisdiction, it was not inconsistent to award custody to all
three children, but child support for only one). See also In re Impola, 464 N.W.2d
296, 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (reversing the lower court decision that awarded
the mother temporary custody and denied temporary child support); Kulko v. Su-
perior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 88 (1978) (stating that the father did not contest the
custody jurisdictional basis but renewed his argument on lack of personal jurisdic-
tion for the child support claim).
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is not necessary.
3. Constitutionality of the UCCJA Exception
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the constitution-
ality of the UCCJA exception to personal jurisdiction in In re Marriage of
Hudson but denied certiorari. 5 5 This section will introduce some of the
arguments concerning the UCCJA exception, and hypothesize on the ra-
tionale the Supreme Court would use to uphold the UCCJA exception to
personal jurisdiction.
One critique of the UCCJA exception is that "[r] eading Shaffer to ex-
cept child custody matters from the requirement of some form of in per-
sonam jurisdiction or other substantive due process fairness is not within
Shaffer's holding and is inconsistent with constitutional law and policy re-
lating to both child protection and parental authority and interests."
56
One response to this argument is that only procedural due process re-
quirements need to be met.
The requirements of due process of law are met in a child custody
proceeding when, in a court having subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute, the out-of-state parent is given notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Personal jurisdiction over the parents is not required to make a
binding custody determination, and a custody decision made in confor-
mity with due process requirements is entitled to recognition by other
states under both the UCCJA's requirement of comity and the standards
of the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. 1
7
Another view is that May v. Anderson15 demands personal jurisdiction
in child custody cases. 9 The counter argument is that May was a full faith
and credit case and not a due process - personal jurisdiction case.' 60 May's
155. See In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983).
156. Blakesley, supra note 1, at 508.
157. In re Marriage of Torres v. Torres 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 352 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
158. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
159. See id. at 533-34 (finding that a court may not cut off a mother's right to
the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without
having jurisdiction over her in personam).
160. See Hudson v. Hudson, 670 P.2d 287, 294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (citations
omitted). The Hudson court held:
In its plurality opinion, the [Supreme] Court held Ohio was not required
to accord full faith and credit to a custody decision rendered in Wiscon-
sin because the latter forum failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over
the mother, an Ohio resident. The plurality's opinion in May has been
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susceptibility to these two interpretations has created a situation where
there is no clear consensus on the existence or stringency of a due process
requirement of personal jurisdiction in custody cases."'
The main problem in an interstate custody case is how to balance a
state's significant interest in the welfare of the child against the due proc-
ess concerns of a nonresident parent.162 The child's interests are para-
mount 63 and the decision to uphold jurisdiction is easy, but trying to pro-
vide a rationale based on precedent is difficult.
There are at least three possible ways that the U.S. Supreme Court
could uphold the UCCJA exception to personal jurisdiction: the status ex-
ception, jurisdiction by necessity, and the Burnham'6 plurality opinion. A
U.S. Supreme Court decision on this issue would probably be analogous
to the Burnham decision, an easy case with conflicting rationales.
Footnote thirty of Shaffer v. Heitner provides justification for the
UCCJA exception to personal jurisdiction. This justification is based on
the premise that custody determinations are "adjudications of status.,1
6 6
severely criticized. For example, several distinguished commentators
have complained that an interpretation of May requiring personal juris-
diction in custody proceedings "would be a catastrophe." Consequently,
the plurality opinion in May has enjoyed little acceptance. Rather May
has been interpreted in accord with Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion which posits the plurality view as permitting states to recognize
foreign custody decrees rendered without personal jurisdiction over an
absent parent under local law but not requiring them to do so under the
full faith and credit clause.
Id. (citation omitted).
161. See Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and
Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REv. 711, 737 (1982).
162. See Helen Garfield, Due Process Rights of Absent Parents in Interstate Custody
Conflicts: A Commentary on In re Marriage of Hudson, 16 IND. L. REv. 445, 445
(1983). The author noted:
Adjudications of custody necessarily involve the resolution of conflicts be-
tween parental rights and the best interests of children.... Recent
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the due process rights of
nonresident defendants raise anew the question of whether the UCCJA
has struck the proper balance between the rights of parents and the wel-
fare of their children.
Id.
163. See Hudson v. Hudson, 670 P.2d 287, 294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (stating
that the paramount issue in custody proceedings is the best interests of the child,
not the feuding parents).
164. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
165. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977).
166. See id.
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The Court cites a law review article written by Justice Rogerj. Traynor. 167
justice Traynor's article discusses the exceptional situation of ex
parte divorce cases in which a plaintiff asks for no more than the right to
remarry and the defendant has only a purposeless interest in barricading
the plaintiffs avenue to freedom. 168 In this situation, the forum state's de-
cree enabling the plaintiff to marry would be justified even though the de-
fendant had no contacts whatever with the forum state.' 69
In addition, justice Traynor discusses the parent-child relationship
and resulting state interest:
There is an element of contract and some equality of parties in
the marital relationship. These are lacking in the parent-child
relationship, and the interest of the state therefore becomes
correspondingly larger in any action involving parent and child.
Contracts [sic] of both parties with the state also take on larger
and perhaps paramount importance, since the consequences of
any action either declaring or terminating the relationship are
so momentous to the parties. In conjunction with fair play,
these considerations would normally preclude jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant having no contact with the forum
state. Nevertheless, even here we must recognize that the state
where a child is present must be competent to regulate his cus-
tody whether his parent is present or not, and if the parent can-
not be found or has failed to discharge his parental obligations,
that state, given the best notice reasonably possible, should be
free to promote the interest of the child by permitting his adop-
tion.1
70
As Professor Coombs points out, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court meticulously cited pages to create the distinction that divorce de-
crees do not require minimum contacts while custody and adoption de-
crees do.'7' Rather, Coombs argues that the Supreme Court "likely cited
Traynor to endorse his argument that minimum contacts are sometimes
needed and sometimes not needed for a fair adjudication of status. " "
Justice Traynor appears to be stating the rule that a state has the
power to regulate a child's custody as long as the child is present and the
167. Id. (citing Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L.
REv. 657, 660-61 (1959)).
168. See id. at 660-61.
169. See id. at 661.
170. Id. at 661-62.
171. Coombs, supra note 161, at 743 n.182.
172. Id. at 744 n.182.
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father's procedural due process rights are not infringed. This rule would
be consistent with the position Justice Traynor and the California Su-
preme Court took in Sampsell v. Superior Court.
73
Footnote thirty of Shaffer and the commentary possibly develop a rule
that the legal relationships involved in cases of child custody are consid-
ered statuses. 74 Only the Supreme Court will be able to authoritatively
decide whether the particularized rules of the UCCJA governing child cus-
tody status are consistent with the standard of fairness. 75 In the mean-
time, courts facing a nonresident's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in a UCCJA case will probably continue to simply cite Shaffer
for the proposition that "minimum contacts" and personal jurisdiction are
unnecessary due to the status exception.
Another rationale the Supreme Court could use to uphold a court's
jurisdiction in an UCCJA case is the "jurisdiction by necessity" argument.
This argument appears as dictum in a footnote of Helicopteros Nacionales de
Columbia v. Hall 1'76
As an alternative to traditional minimum-contacts analysis, re-
spondents suggest that the Court hold that the State of Texas
had personal jurisdiction over Helicol under a doctrine of "ju-
risdiction by necessity.".. . We conclude, however, that respon-
dents failed to carry their burden of showing that all three de-
fendants could not be sued together in a single forum. It is not
clear from the record, for example, whether suit could have
been brought against all three defendants in either Colombia or
Peru. We decline to consider adoption of a doctrine of jurisdic-
tion by necessity-a potentially far-reaching modification of ex-
isting law-in the absence of a more complete record. 
77
Footnote thirty-seven of Shaffer raised, but did not discuss, the ques-
tion of whether the presence of a defendant's property in a state might be
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the
plaintiff.7 '
173. 197 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1948). The court accepts several alternative bases of
initial jurisdiction in child custody proceedings. See id. at 749-50. The Sampsell
court's recognition of the three alternative bases of initial jurisdiction in child cus-
tody cases was later endorsed by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and
gained wide acceptance in state courts. See Coombs, supra note 161, at 719.
174. See Coombs, supra note 161, at 745.
175. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 n.30 (1977).
176. 466 U.S. 408 (1983).
177. Id. at 419 n.13 (citations omitted).
178. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (1977).
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This argument may apply to a child custody case when there is not a
single forum that would satisfy both the jurisdictional requirements of the
UCCJA and the "minimum contacts" standard. 179 If the Supreme Court
required personal jurisdiction in this situation, the interests of the child
would have to be sacrificed for the convenience of the parents and the
UCCJA would be nullified.180
The Supreme Court could solve this problem by holding that there is
"jurisdiction by necessity" where there is no other forum available to the
plaintiff. In this situation, the interest of the forum state in providing a
means to adjudicate the custody of a child would give the state the power
to determine the rights of all the parties involved provided the parties are
given a full opportunity to appear and be heard.181
The final rationale that the Supreme Court might use is Justice
Scalia's argument in Burnham.8 2 Arguably, one of the most firmly estab-
lished principles of state jurisdiction is the rule that the state where a child
is physically present has jurisdiction to decide what is best for the child.8 3
Furthermore, this tradition is not only old, but every state has recently re-
considered and modified the rule by enacting the UCCJA.8 4
Thus, the Court might find that because the UCCJA was adopted by
the American people, individual Justices' perceptions of fairness should
not override the States' "traditional notions of fairness.""5 The Court
could consequently hold that jurisdiction based on the UCCJA constitutes
due process because it continues and improves a tradition of our legal sys-
tem; it satisfies the standard of "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. " "
179. See Garfield, supra note 162, at 462. Garfield observed:
If personal jurisdiction is required in custody cases, inevitably instances
will arise in which the state qualifying for custody jurisdiction under the
UCCJA cannot require personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent.
In such cases, the custody action will have to be brought in the state
where the parent can be served, but that state may not qualify for custody
jurisdiction under the UCCJA standards.
Id.
180. See id.
181. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950) (holding that a state has an interest in determining the rights to a
trust). This case note makes the analogy to child custody proceedings.
182. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 606-27 (1990).
183. See id. at 610.
184. See id. at 615.
185. See id, at 627.
186. See id. at 619.
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In summary, there are three possible rationales for upholding the
UCCJA exception to personal jurisdiction. Although there probably
would be conflicting rationales, the Supreme Court would likely decide
that "minimum contacts" are unnecessary as long as the UCCJA was satis-
fied."8 7 The Hughs court should have used the UCCJA exception and pro-
ceeded to determine whether the UCCJAjurisdictional requirements were
satisfied.'
D. The Hughs Court Had UCCJA Jurisdiction
The Hughs court had UCCJA jurisdiction to make the protective or-
der. The court would have had UCCJA jurisdiction over this custody mat-
ter in three ways: it was in the best interest of the child; the child allegedly
had been subjected to abuse; and no other court had jurisdiction.
Under Minnesota's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act, a court has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by
initial or modification decree under a variety of conditions. There is ju-
risdiction if Minnesota is the home state of the child, if it is in the best in-
terest of the child, if the child is present in the state, or if it appears that
no other state would have jurisdiction. 8 "
187. Sometimes the terms "personal jurisdiction" and "minimum contacts" are
interchanged. See supra Part I1.B and accompanying notes. Whether the terms are
synonymous is arguable.
188. See Zappitello v. Moses, 458 N.W.2d 784, 787 (S.D. 1990) (stating that a
trial court must first proceed with an analysis of the jurisdictional requirements set
forth in the UCCJA).
189. MINN. STAT. § 518A.03, subd. 1 (1998). This subdivision provides:
(a) this state
(1) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or
(2) had been the child's home state within six months before com-
mencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state be-
cause of removal or retention by a person claiming custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this
state; or
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because
(1) the child and the parents, or the child and at least one contest-
ant, have a significant connection with this state, and
(2) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relation-
ships; or
(c) the child is physically present in this state and
(1) the child has been abandoned or
(2) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the
child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or
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Even if a Minnesota court has jurisdiction based on the UCCJA, the
doctrine of continuing jurisdiction allows a child custody modification
only if the original state no longer has jurisdiction or if the original state
declines to acceptjurisdiction.'9 The original state no longer has jurisdic-
tion if both parents have moved from the state.' 9'
In addition, before a Minnesota court can assert jurisdiction under
the UCCJA, it must first determine the existence of a previous decree. 92 If
it finds an original decree, the court should contact the original state and
possibly stay its own proceedings. 93 A family court's temporary custody
order may be reversed and remanded for appropriate jurisdictional fact
findings if the order does not comply with the UCCJA.
194
The Hughs court would have had UCCJA jurisdiction over this cus-
tody matter under three separate provisions: it was in the best interest of
the child;195 the child allegedly had been subjected to abuse;'9 and no
other court had jurisdiction. 97 If the court had applied the UCCJA, the
is otherwise neglected or dependent; or
(d) (1) it appears that no court in another state would have jurisdiction
under prerequisites substantially in accordance with clause (a), (b), or
(c), or a court of another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on
the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to de-
termine the custody of the child, and
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state as-
sume jurisdiction.
Id.
190. See MINN. STAT. § 518A.14, subd. 1 (1998); see also In re McLain, 569
N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (denyingjurisdiction to a Minnesota court
where the Texas district court has continuing jurisdiction).
191. See Blakesley, supra note 1, at 477.
192. See In re Coleman v. Coleman, 493 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing In re Marriage of Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d 99, 103-04 (Minn. 1989)).
193. See id.
194. See Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d at 103-04.
195. See MINN. STAT. § 518A.03 subd. 1 (b) (1998). Both the child and the
mother had a significant connection with Minnesota, and there was substantial
evidence concerning the child's present care, protection, and personal relation-
ships available in Minnesota. See Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, 572 N.W.2d 747, 749
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997). For example, the mother introduced a letter from a psy-
chologist who interviewed the boy, and the boy supposedly threatened to run away
if he was sent to visit his father. See id. at 750.
196. See MINN. STAT. § 518A.03(1) (c) (1998). The child was physically present
in Minnesota and it was necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
the child has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. See
Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 749. The court in Hughs looked at the standard of the Do-
mestic Abuse Act and the facts of the case and concluded that the father presented
an intent to harm the child or inflict fear of harm. See id. at 752.
197. See MNN. STAT. § 518A.03(1) (d) (1998). In Hughs, no other state would
have had jurisdiction under subdivisions (a), (b), or (c) of Minnesota Statutes sec-
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protective order could still have been upheld, but the court would not
have had to make a futile minimum contacts analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's analysis in Hughs is unsound because the father did not
have any contacts with Minnesota that would satisfy the specific jurisdic-
tion minimum contacts requirement. One's child is not a contact, good
faith telephone calls to one's son are not acts of purposeful availment, and
the telephone calls were not related to the cause of action. Because the
elements of specific jurisdiction were not met, the court did not have per-
sonal jurisdiction.
Instead, the court should have declared that interstate child protec-
tive orders fall under the umbrella of the UCCJA. The statutory language
of the UCCJA, the court's admission, and the persuasive authority of the
South Dakota Supreme Court support this conclusion.
Since the UCCJA does not require personal jurisdiction, the court
would not have had to make a futile minimum contacts analysis. Finally,
the Hughs court would have had UCCJAjurisdiction to issue the protective
order.
Anthony A. Dorland
tion 518A.03(1). See Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 748. Under subdivision (a), Ohio
could not be the home state because neither of the parents lived there. See MINN.
STAT. § 518A.03(1)(a). Under subdivision (b), it would be hard to argue that
Pennsylvania had a significant connection with the child, and under subdivision
(c) the child must be physically present in the forum state. See MINN. STAT.
§518A.03(1) (c). NewJersey, the original decreeing state, had the least significant
connection with the child. See Hughs, 572 N.W.2d at 748.
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